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A CONSTITUTIONAL BEGINNING: MAKING SOUTH
AFRICA'S FINAL CONSTITUTION
Christina Murray*
South Africa's history is familiar to many people. Although race
distinctions and racially-based legislation had been part of government
in the region since the beginning of colonial rule, in 1948, the
Afrikaner-based National Party came to power on an overtly racist
ticket with plans to deepen the racial divide in the country-apartheid,
or separateness, became the unashamed ideal. By 1980, the franchise
had been removed from the small number of black people to whom the
1910 Union Constitution gave it, and millions of black people in both
rural and urban areas had been removed to ensure the racial purity of
white areas. In addition, the movement of Africans was severely
restricted by an elaborate pass system, and millions of black people
were restricted to poverty-stricken homelands. Black people, who
comprised about eighty percent of the population, possessed just
twenty percent of the land. Four purported independent states where
blacks could exercise purported full political rights had been carved out
of the greater South Africa. The education system had been corrupted
to ensure first-class education for white people and meager (and "more
appropriate") education for blacks. Discrimination in jobs was legally
required in some industries, and a given in all others. Social welfare
benefits and health services were scaled according to need-with the
understanding that black people needed less. Political opposition was
viciously quashed through draconian legislation that paid no attention
to the rule of law and through extra-legal action by security forces.
The 1980s saw some changes in government policy and has been
characterized as a period of both reform and repression. Black trade
unions had just been legalized in the late 1970s giving black workers
an important political platform. Both pass laws and restrictions on the
purchase of land were lifted. New attempts were made to bring mixed-
race, or "coloured" and Indian people (but not Africans)' into the
* Christina Murray is Professor of Human Rights and Constitutional Law at the
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established to advise the South African Constitutional Assembly on drafting the new
South African Constitution. This paper is an extended version of the 1999 Altheimer
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i. In South Africa, apartheid divided the population into four main groups:
whites, who are people of European descent; coloureds, who are people of mixed race;
Indians, who are descendants of people who came to South Africa from the Indian
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political process. At the same time, however, security forces acted
with increased brutality to suppress any opposition to the apartheid
government, and two long and vicious states of emergency were
imposed on large areas of the country.
In its 1998 Report, the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission' found the apartheid government to have been responsible
for gross violations of human rights. The Report documents the cases
of thousands of victims of murder and torture by state security forces;
it describes a strategy, supported by the South African Cabinet, to deal
with opposition to apartheid by eliminating or "taking out," to use the
state's euphemisms, those in opposition. Security force action ranged
from relatively minor harassment, such as dumping manure on a
person's front lawn, to elaborately planned murders. The recently
revealed actions of cardiologist Dr. Wouter Basson were particularly
grotesque. Basson, whom the South African press dubbed "Dr Death,"
headed a program, which, among other things, worked on a method of
making all black people sterile. He was also responsible for supplying
nerve gas and other poisons which killed hundreds of people.
Against this background, the gathering on May 7, 1996 of about
fifty politicians to negotiate the final provisions of a democratic
constitution for South Africa was a miracle. Late that night, Cyril
Ramaphosa, the Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, pleaded
with the group in his characteristically ironic fashion: "I know it's late
but just twenty minutes more, just twenty minutes-for our constitution
which is for the next twenty years, no, fifty years, 100 years, 200 years .. ."
He may just as well have said, "Another twenty minutes for we have
come so far already."
The preceding six years had seen a painful and rocky, sometimes
violent, process of negotiated transition for South Africa from a racist
oligarchy to a fledgling democracy. Prisoners had been released;
subcontinent; and Africans, who are indigenous South Africans belonging to a number
of ethnic groups.
2. An agreement in the negotiating process established the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission ("TRC"). Its purpose is to enable South Africans to come
to terms with their violent and lawless past on a morally acceptable basis and to
advance the cause of reconciliation. It carries out its mission through three committees:
the Amnesty Committee, the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee, and the Human
Rights Violations Committee. The TRC is based on the Promotion of National Unity
and Reconciliation Act. See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No.
34 (1995), available at <http://www.truth.org.za/legal/act9534.htm>. The TRC Report,
its decisions, and a full description of its work can be found at its website. See TRC.
Welcome to the Official Truth and Reconciliation Commission Website (last modified Mar.
8, 2001) <http://www.truth. org.za>.
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apartheid government security forces and members of the armed wings
of the two liberation movements were given amnesty; democratic
elections were held; armed forces were merged; and racism was
outlawed.' A coalition known as the "Government of National Unity"
replaced the National Party government, which had ruled the country
for forty-six years. The African National Congress ("ANC") dominated
the new government after the ANC had won 63.7 percent of the vote
in the 1994 elections and, accordingly, held twenty of the thirty cabinet
positions. In the preceding fourteen months leaders from both sides
negotiated an entire constitution; designed executive, legislative, and
judicial branches; agreed upon a Bill of Rights; and settled provincial
and local government powers. Additionally, they dealt with all the
seemingly minor issues so critical to a negotiated change. They made
a tiny and carefully limited space for self-determination for Afrikaners.
They established a Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the
Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities to reassure
Afrikaners of their place in South Africa's future, and they put in place
a Gender Commission to advance women's interests. They secured the
rights of traditional leaders, chiefs and headmen, and they drafted
detailed provisions relating to the financial management of the state to
reassure the business community, both at home and abroad, of the
intention of the new South Africa to run a clean government.
Ramaphosa's plea for twenty minutes was, of course, successful.
Past secretary-general of the powerful National Union of Mineworkers,
3. The violence in the country at the time should not be underemphasized.
Politically motivated killings were commonplace, and the ANC leadership in particular
was under a great deal of criticism from followers for speaking to what many
considered the enemy while bloodshed continued. The government security forces were
suspected of deliberately instigating violence and behaving in a partisan way in the
conflict between Inkatha and the ANC. See THE LONG JOURNEY: SOUTH AFRICA's QUEST
FOR A NEGOTIATED SETrLEMENT 139 (Steven Friedman ed., 1993) [hereinafter LONG
JOURNEY]. A number of particularly serious incidents almost brought the peace process
to an end. In June 1992, shack dwellers in Boipatong were massacred by raiders
assumed to be Inkatha members supported by the police. In September 1992, Ciskei
Defense Force soldiers opened fire on ANC supporters marching on the capital of
Ciskei, Bisho, and 28 people were killed. See PATTI WALDMEIR, ANATOMY OF A MIRACLE:
THE END OF APARTHEID AND THE BIRTH OF THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA 207-08 (1997). The
Afrikaner right wing threatened war if majority rule was implemented. Amazingly,
negotiations were back on course in early 1993, but they were nearly brought to an end
once again when a right wing gunman assassinated Chris Hani, a popular and
charismatic leader of the South African Communist Party and the Umkhonto we Sizwe.
See NIGEL WORDEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN SOUTH AFRICA: CONQUEST, SEGREGATION
AND APARTHEID 134-41 (1994); see also Mary de Haas, Political Violence, in 5 South
African Human Rights Yearbook 222 (1995).
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a veteran of South Africa's negotiation process, and the African
National Congress's chief negotiator, Ramaphosa had steered the
Constitutional Assembly through some difficult times and had earned
the respect of everyone in the process Foreign visitors were often
surprised to see a politician chairing the process, expecting instead a
judge or someone else who was clearly non-partisan. But Ramaphosa's
chairmanship more than vindicated the decision to put a politician in
the chair. His insistence that the Constitutional Assembly was no place
for rhetorical speeches and political grandstanding, his patent even-
handedness, and his sheer political skill ensured results.
By May 7, 1996, a plea for "just twenty minutes longer" had
become Ramaphosa's mantra, and he got a laugh as always. But May
7 was different, for it was a day before the deadline established in the
interim constitution for drafting what was dubbed the "final constitu-
tion." The draft had to be finished, printed, and put before the entire
Constitutional Assembly of 490 politicians the next morning. The last
of the most difficult matters-education, property, and labour
rights-had been settled over the previous couple of days. But twenty
minutes became three or four hours as last-minute concerns were raised
and details of drafting revisited. Just as the last "i's" were dotted and
the last "t's" crossed, the governing party of apartheid, De Klerk's
National Party, remembered that it had forgotten to protect the
parliamentary pensions in the new constitution. ANC politicians
groaned at the sight of the old white government trying to cling to the
vestiges of privilege and power once again. But another twenty-minute
recess was announced, another set of caucus meetings held, and
another bilateral negotiation between the ANC and the National Party
took place before the proposal failed. Patience was essential, for the
new constitution needed the support of two-thirds of the Constitutional
Assembly to pass. Nine months later, early in 1997, South Africans put
into operation a new constitution that they now boast is the most
progressive in the world.
4. By the time he was appointed Chair of the Constitutional Assembly in 1994,
Ramaphosa, then just 41, was an experienced negotiator. In the 1980s, initially as legal
adviser to the Council of Unions of South Africa, he played a critical role in
establishing and then running the National Union of Mineworkers. He was centrally
involved in the negotiations that led to the 1994 elections as head of the ANC's
negotiating team. See ANC, Cyril Ramaphosa (visited Mar. 30, 2001) <http://www.anc.
org.za/people/ramaphosac.html >.
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1. AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTION
Of course, the constitution-drafting process was only part of the
story. Negotiations between the apartheid government and the banned
ANC started in the mid-1980s.5 A new constitutional order was only
one of the requirements for transforming the country from a racial
oligarchy to a democracy. First, the main negotiators had to develop
trust; violence both by the South African security forces and liberation
movements had to end; prisoners had to be released; and exiled South
Africans, particularly political leaders, given an opportunity to return
to the country. By June 1, 1993, after many meetings, breakdowns in
negotiations, apparently insurmountable disagreements,, and significant
compromises on all sides, the negotiators reached a landmark decision.
They agreed on an election date, opening the way for the first serious
constitutional negotiations.
A fundamental question in the 1993 negotiations was how to
accommodate conflicting views on constitution-making. The govern-
ing National Party wanted to settle everything before elections were
held and power slipped from its grasp. On the other hand, the ANC
insisted that constitution-drafting was the prerogative of a democrati-
cally elected body-in which it was justly confident of a substantial
majority-and not the arbitrary group that sat around the negotiating
table in 1993.
The outcome of this debate was typical of the entire process-a
compromise. The parties to the 1993 "Multi-Party Negotiating
Process" would negotiate an interim constitution, which would become
binding immediately after the elections. The interim constitution
would set up a process for drafting a so'called final constitution, which
would start immediately after the elections. The newly elected
politicians were to draft the final constitution, but, critically, it was to
conform to a set of principles, which were to be settled in the 1993
Multi-Party Negotiating Process.6  Finally, a newly established
5. See LONG JOURNEY, supra note 3, at 95; SOUTH AFRICAN REVIEW 7: THE SMALL
MIRACLE (Steven Friedman & Doreen Atkinson eds., 1994); WALDMEIR, supra note 3;
Hugh Corder, Towards a South African Constitution, 57 MOD. L. REV. 491 (1994).
6. The Namibian independence process with which many South Africans were
familiar had also used constitutional principles to guide and constrain its constitution-
making process. United Nations Security Council Resolution 435, adopted by the
Security Council at its 2087th meeting in September 1978, required a Constitutional
Assembly to be elected, which was to draft a constitution in accordance with eight
principles listed in the resolution. See S.C. Res. 435, U.N. SCOR, 33rd Sess., 2087th
mtg. (1978). The constitution was to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the
2001]
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Constitutional Court would have the job of certifying that the final
constitution adopted after the elections complied with the agreed-upon
principles.' Only after the new constitution was certified could it be
put in force.
The interim constitution contained further details." All members
of the bicameral Parliament elected in the 1994 elections were to act as
a Constitutional Assembly for the purpose of drafting the final
constitution. The constitution required a two-thirds majority for
passage; and, if agreement could not be reached within the stipulated
period of two years, a series of deadlock-breaking mechanisms would
execute, including, as a last resort, new elections. If a constitution was
adopted but the Constitutional Court found that it did not comply with
the Constitutional Principles, the Assembly would have a chance to
amend it and resubmit it to the court.
For constitutional lawyers, the role of the Constitutional Court
introduced an "Alice in Wonderland" element to the process. It meant
that it was possible for the Constitutional Assembly to adopt an
unconstitutional constitution. But, as I shall describe later, it was a
godsend for the negotiating process, not only because it provided the
basis for successful negotiations in 1993, but also because it introduced
some unexpected room to manuver in subsequent negotiation of the
final constitution.
The agreement to bifurcate the constitution-making process
allowed negotiations to move ahead. The list of thirty-four Constitu-
tional Principles9 with which the final constitution had to comply
included many familiar provisions: constitutional supremacy; judicial
review; an independent judiciary; the protection of the right to equality;
separation of powers with checks and balances; protection of human
rights; and a division of powers between national and provincial
government. Some of the principles reflected very South African
concerns. For instance, Principle XXXI demanded that security forces
Namibian Assembly. See LIONEL CLIFFE ET AL., THE TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE IN
NAMIBIA 49 (1994).
7. The Constitutional Court is based on the Continental model. It has
constitutional jurisdiction only. One of the main reasons for having a separate
constitutional court and not simply giving the most senior existing court jurisdiction in
constitutional matters was that it was important that newly appointed judges should deal
with constitutional matters, and not judges appointed under the apartheid regime. In
fact, of the I I judges first appointed to the court, six had served on the Supreme Court
Bench under apartheid.
8. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. (Act 200, 1993).
9. The Constitutional Principles were included in the interim constitution as
Schedule 4. See id. at sched. 4 (Constitutional Principles).
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act in the national interest and not in the interest of any particular party.
This principle was a direct response to the brutal experiences of many
South Africans at the hands of the police and army under apartheid.
Apartheid had distorted the role of traditional leaders; chiefs who
would not cooperate were deposed and replaced with more compliant
people. Accordingly, a principle protecting the traditional roles of
chiefs and headmen promised a better future. ° The principle that
demanded that the future constitution protect the right to equality
responded to foreign-and particularly American-experience in
implementing equality, specifically stating that affirmative action
should not be interpreted to infringe the guarantee of equality." But
the principles also carry the mark of the negotiated settlement, and
include provisions that sound out of place in a constitutional document.
For instance, Principle XXXI reflects the jitteriness of those about to
lose power to a future black government. It states, "every member of
the civil service is entitled to a free pension."' 2  The principles
describing the division of power between the national government and
provinces contain complex, and sometimes apparently contradictory,
detail. This state of affairs resulted partly because the National Party
believed that, although it could not hold on to national power, a
provincial system would allow it to retain a power base. These
Constitutional Principles were to ensure that provincial power would
be real power. Similarly, in an attempt to ensure that the KwaZulu-
Natal-based Inkatha Freedom Party ("IFP") would participate in both
the 1994 elections and the constitution-writing process, the principles
were amended in early 1994 to ensure that the new constitution would
not prohibit provinces from recognizing the "role, status and authority"
of a traditional monarch.'
The last-minute attempts to persuade the IFP to participate in the
process were not successful. Although it did contest the elections-and
won a majority of seats in the KwaZulu-Natal provincial legislature
and three places in the national Cabinet of the Government of National
10. See id. at sched. 4, Principle XIII.
II. See id. at Principle V.
12. Id. at Principle XXXI.
13. Ambiguity in an agreement is, of course, not uncommon. It reoccurs in the final
constitution in a number of places where agreement was hard to reach. For an
interesting discussion of the uses of ambiguity in agreements and the response of
mediators, see Christopher Honeyman, in Defense of Ambiguity, NEGOTIATION J., Jan.
1987, at 81.
14. S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. (Act 200, 1993), sched. 4 (Constitutional Principles),
Principle XIII(2), amended by Act 3 of 1994, § 2.
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Unity-it withdrew from the constitutional negotiations in a dispute
about the use of international mediators. Thus, the Constitutional
Assembly's dream that the new constitution should incorporate the
aspirations of all South Africans was undermined at the outset.
I1. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY GETS DOWN TO WORK
The 1994 elections gave the ANC a huge majority in Parliament,
but not the two-thirds that was necessary to pass the constitution. From
the outset it was apparent that the ANC sought the balance of the
necessary support from its long-standing opposite in the negotiating
process, the National Party. But it was also clear that the final
constitution could not be the negotiated deal that the interim constitu-
tion was. It needed to be drafted in a more open process that involved
rather than excluded the public. Accordingly, the Constitutional
Assembly set up two parallel processes: an enormous public participa-
tion programme and a programme of political discussions. In addition,
as the constitution started taking shape, the Assembly administration
put together a technical team to work on the technical issues in the text
of the constitution.
A. You've Made Your Mark Now Have Your Say: The Constitu-
tional Assembly's Public Participation Program
The Constitutional Assembly's slogan "You've made your mark
now have your say" invited the many millions of South Africans who
had voted for the first time in 1994 to contribute to the country's first
democratic constitution-and over two million did so.
The public participation scheme was intended to provide both
basic education on democracy and constitutionalism and to elicit the
public's opinion on what the constitution should say. To do this it used
the press, radio and television, the Web, and its own publicity cam-
paign.
Radio is one of the most important means of communication in
South Africa because it reaches people in both rural and urban
areas-it is estimated that eighty-two percent of the population over
eighteen listens to the radio some of the time. Each week, over ten
million people heard the jaunty voice of Constitutional Talk's an-
nouncer welcoming them to the constitutional talk-line in one of five
[Vol. 23
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of the country's eleven official languages. 5 In addition, the Constitu-
tional Assembly's eight-page newsletter was distributed to 160,000
people each fortnight and, in mid-1996, twenty percent of a sample
group said that they had seen it. In just under four months-January
I to April 17, 1996--6,655 people, or 107 people a day, consulted the
Constitutional Assembly's home page on the Web,' 6 and a series of
thirty-seven television programs reached thirty-four percent of
television viewers.
In April 1996, an independent nationwide survey of 3,800 South
Africans suggested that the Constitutional Assembly media campaign
had succeeded in reaching seventy-three percent of all adult South
Africans, or 18.5 million people.' 7 Equally important, the statistics
showed that people had not merely heard about the constitution and the
constitution-making process, but that they were interested in it. Eighty-
four percent of survey respondents said they would be interested in
reading the completed constitution. 8
The fact that the Constitutional Assembly received over two
million submissions from the public reflected this interest. Certainly,
the bulk of these were in the form of petitions (mainly dealing with
abortion,'the death penalty, pornography, and animal rights). Never-
theless, over 1 i,000 substantive submissions were received, varying
from general pleas that the constitution contribute to an improvement
in the quality of life by, for instance, guaranteeing running water,
housing, education, and health care, to more specific submissions
sometimes dealing with very technical matters such as the status of the
central bank, the precise role of the Public Protector (or Ombudsman),
15. See HASSEN EBRAHiM, THE SOUL OF A NATION: CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN SOUTH
AFRICA 246 (1998); South Africa: Making the Constitution, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 1996, at
42.
16. See EBRAHIM, supra note 15, at 246 n. 16. The website is Constitutional Assembly
(n.d.), <www.constitution.org.za>.
17. See Constitutional Talk, April 22-May 8, 1996, No. 3 (reporting on the results
of an independent survey by the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE)).
18. See EBRAHIM, supra note 15, at 358 n. 19.
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the appropriate size of Parliament, and the structure of local govern
ment.' 9
Statistics almost never convey the full picture. In this case they
obscure two things. First, they fail to convey the vitality and energy of
the public participation program. Foreign visitors most often com-
mented on the large and bright Constitutional Assembly advertisements
on busses encouraging people to "have their say" or, later in the
process, reminding them that the constitution was to be "one law for
one nation." People in rural areas are more likely to remember lively
public meetings at which basic education in constitutional matters
accompanied reports from politicians on progress in the Constitutional
Assembly and opportunities for participants to record their views.20
Parliament itself was also often the venue for workshops and public
hearings, and on a number of occasions tribal leaders, dressed in
splendid traditional garb, converged on Cape Town to discuss their
constitutional future.
The success of the program is also captured in the variety of
submissions received by the Assembly. Some were technical and
abstract, while others captured the aspirations of a young nation on the
brink of change. Thus, in response to the call for submissions, Anita
Mogoasa wrote:
WHAT MY PROBLEMS/ ISSUES/ CONCERNS ARE...
We need a higher primary school in our village.
We also need water.
We need electricity.
We also need fields where we can plant crops so that when we are
hungry we can find food.
We also need bursaries for furthering our education so that we may
be like the people of other areas who are enlightened.
We need teachers.
19. See id. at 242-49. Ebrahim states that over 1.7 million submissions were made
in the first part of the process. Although most of these were petitions, over 11,000 were
substantive. The Constitutional Assembly called for submissions once again when over
five million copies of the "Refined Working Draft" of the constitution were distributed
in November 1995. On this occasion the Assembly received over 250,000 submissions.
Again, many of these were in the form of petitions but many were not; because these
submissions were made in response to a draft text, many were more specific than those
that had been received in the first part of the process.
20. See EBRAHIM, supra note 15, at 244 ("Between February and August 1995,
twenty-six public meetings were organized . . . and more than 200 members of the
Constitutional Assembly became involved in them. It was calculated that 20,549 people
attended workshops, and 717 organizations participated." ).
[Vol. 23
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Those are our needs in our villages.2'
And Sampson Moholoane wrote:
I want to stress one area which I believe as a citizen of South Africa
one should have access to at all times.
That is a welfare programme that will leave no South African from
being able to afford three square meals a day. It must be a citizen's
right to be able to have shelter and food even when he is not
working, even if he is a destitute. The new Constitution must make
this compulsory.... 22
Children wrote about child abuse and the need for shelter and food.
Churches proposed the protection of church property and recognition
of God as the highest authority in the land. South Africa's own gun
lobby demanded the right to bear arms. Education was high on many
people's lists. And traditional leaders spelled out what their relation-
ship should be to their people and to municipal structures. The
submissions reflected South Africa's diversity-and some of its
idiosyncrasies. A well-known nudist demanded the right not to wear
clothes, and one David Mavubukwana, writing Poste Restante the
Hombe Store in rural Lusikisiki added to his demand of electricity,
education, and a monthly pension that "[w]e must be allowed to sell
our dagga [marijuana]. 23
Like the submissions, the Constitutional Assembly's own publicity
conveyed some of the energy that infused the process. Thus, the
newsletter, Constitutional Talk, carried a cartoon strip that introduced
the most complex constitutional concepts to its readers and enlivened
more well known ones. But the most popular image that the Constitu-
tional Assembly produced was of our greatly loved President, Nelson
Mandela, standing outside his Cape Town offices, one hand casually
in his suit pocket, and speaking on a cell phone. The bubble above his
head says, "Hello, is that the Constitutional Talk-line? I would like to
make my submission."
If the first problem with the statistics is that they do not do justice
to the public participation program, the second is that they conceal the
fact that its goals were not always clear and leave the concrete results
of the program obscure. In fact, some commentators were openly
21. See Constitutional Assembly (n.d.). <http://www. constitution.org.za>.




skeptical, describing the entire program as an elaborate hoax, designed
to hide the fact that even the final constitution was to be a negotiated
document and not the democratically determined one that the ANC
claimed it would be. In support of this argument, people pointed to the
huge volume of submissions and asked if any politicians could be
expected to review them all. Moreover, these critics might have added,
if the politicians had reviewed the submissions, they would have found
vague wish lists, more often concerned with poverty and the standard
of living, than with matters appropriately dealt with in a constitution.24
This criticism of the process is not entirely unwarranted. Even
those who read through the submissions found repetition rather than
inspiration, and, in many painful requests based on deep poverty, they
found the legacy of apartheid rather than a design for the future. But
the public participation program was not intended to provide a list of
matters that should be included in the constitution. Advertising which
suggested this, like the Constitutional Assembly poster asserting, "The
constitution is being written by the most important person in the
country: You!" might be criticized for being misleading. In any event,
it is unlikely that many people thought that their ideas would find their
way directly into the constitution. Instead, the program had broader,
less instrumental goals. One goal frequently invoked was that the new
constitution should be "owned" by all South Africans. To Cyril
Ramaphosa this meant that the constitution should be one which South
Africans "know" and which they "feel belongs to them." To Baleka
Mbete-Kgositsile, now Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly,
public participation would ensure that the constitution would "be
sensitive to and shaped by [the] realities" of the people of South
Africa." Under this approach, the public participation program would
facilitate "ownership" of the constitution by all South Africans by
ensuring that it was not drafted by an isolated political elite, and by
fostering an active interest in it in all communities. Secondly, like
programs encouraging the participation of the public in ordinary
legislative processes and in the drafting of regulations, the participation
of the public in the constitution-making process gave the politicians
another way of keeping in touch with the people that they represent and
gave citizens an additional way of reaching those politicians. Never-
theless, it was always clear that the newly elected representatives in the
24. Criticism was registered in a number of articles in the press. See also SIRI
GLOPPEN. SOUTH AFRICA: THE BATTLE OVER THE CONSTITUTION 259 (1997).
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Constitutional Assembly would mediate the views of the public in
crafting the constitution.
B. The Political Process: Meetings, Hearings, Bilaterals and
Multilaterals
When the new government took office after the 1994 elections, it
faced huge challenges. For instance, it had to convert the old apartheid
state into an open democracy. It had to reorganize government so that
it could deliver services to all South Africans rather than the small
number who had benefited in the past. And it had to transform the
police service and integrate the apartheid defense force with the armies
of two liberation movements, the ANC's Umkhonto we Sizwe and the
PAC's Apla. Constitution-making was one of many tasks. But the
interim constitution required the final constitution to be drafted in just
two years. In fact, by the time the Constitutional Assembly got properly
into gear, only fifteen or so months remained.
Soon a relatively small group of politicians was allocated to the six
theme committees that did the initial work in the Constitutional
Assembly. The theme committees established the parameters of the
discussion in each of their areas through debate, public hearings, and
workshops. Non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") and members
of civil society with a specific interest in the issues participated in the
public hearings, and the workshops included both local and foreign
experts. For politicians who had not been involved in the constitutional
negotiations that preceded the elections, this process provided an
intensive course in constitutional issues. For organizations outside
Parliament and the public, it offered the first opportunities to engage
the constitution-makers. The theme committees met regularly in the
first half of 1995, but progress was very slow. By July 1995, a smaller
committee of forty or so politicians, backed up by various advisers
appointed by the Assembly and by their own political advisers, and
divided into subcommittees, had taken over. This group produced a
first draft of the constitution in September 1995 and a Working Draft,
which was widely circulated for comment, in November.
Some viewed the first composite draft, a compilation of the work
of the initial six committees, with skepticism. Full of gaps and often
offering a number of alternatives, it suggested that the Constitutional
Assembly was unlikely to get its job done on time. But the process was
gathering momentum. Slowly gaps were filled and alternatives
eliminated. Certainly, some issues were decided and then revisited, but
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the repeated production of "full" drafts provided everyone involved in
the process with a sense of progress. As the final May 1996 deadline
drew nearer, earlier deadlines were set for the resolution of specific
matters. Long meetings stretching into the night became common, and
the Constitutional Assembly's practice of providing a meal or snacks
every two hours was a lifesaver.
Initially the process was open. The public had access to meetings,
and the press and NGOs made some use of this opportunity. The
Constitutional Assembly was justly proud of the transparency of the
process. But as the Assembly faced the most controversial issues, such
as language rights, the right to education and the language of education,
property rights, and labour rights, politicians started engaging in closed
bilateral or multilateral meetings with their political counterparts.
Sometimes these meetings were very informal. "May I suggest,"
Ramaphosa said on occasion from the chair, "that we take an early tea
break so that Mr. Ackermann [the National Party politician responsible
for the disputed issue] and Mr. Ngcuka [his ANC counterpart] can
discuss this matter." "Mr. Ackermann and Mr. Ngcuka," he might add,
"I expect you to come back with a solution." And often they did.2"
Occasionally one would encounter Ramaphosa himself settled
comfortably with a whisky discussing ways of resolving seemingly
intractable problems with his National Party counterpart, Roelf Meyer.
But the bilaterals and multilaterals that characterized the later part of
the process were often more formal and less relaxed. And whatever
their form, they excluded the public.
Despite the Assembly's commitment to transparency, meetings
away from the watchful eye of the press were probably essential if
matters that had divided the country for a century were to be resolved.
An ambitious multilateral meeting at the isolated beach resort of
Amiston demonstrated this reality. Here, over three days, some of the
most difficult issues of the process were resolved. The results of the
Arniston multilaterals and ensuing negotiations were reported at a
marathon meeting of the Constitutional Committee which met from
8:35 p.m. on April 18 to 5:47 a.m. on April 19. As always, the meeting
was punctuated by adjournments for negotiation and discussion. But
there were also moments of applause, such as when the agreement to
include in the Constitution a Commission for the Promotion and
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious, and Linguistic Commu-
25. See EBRAHIM, supra note 15, at 254 (commenting on tea breaks during the 1992
negotiations).
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nities was announced. It was "an historic occasion and the beginning
of a better future for all South Africans," Mr Beyers of the National
Party said. The ANC's Vali Moosa said that it "captured in a progres-
sive and democratic manner the aspirations of the people." And the
Freedom Front's leader, General Constand Viljoen, emotionally
welcomed the agreement as a "brave step" and a recognition that group
rights and not only individual rights had a place in South Africa in the
future.26
C. Getting the Language Right
At the outset of the drafting process, the Constitutional Assembly
made a decision that the constitution should be drafted in plain
language. South Africans, perhaps like Americans, clothe most legal
documents in heavy-handed and repetitious prose. For instance, we
"revoke, cancel, and annul" wills, we "confirm, ratify, and adopt"
agreements, we "pledge, cede, assign, transfer, deliver, and make over"
our "right, title, and interest in and to payment" of debts, and we
"constitute and appoint" people to be our "attorney, agent, and
representative." The constitution was to repudiate this tradition
because it was to be readable.
A Canadian plain-language expert assisted in the process and a
small team of lawyers worked with him.27 But this Technical Refine-
ment Team confronted a burden far greater than the task of transform-
ing the constitutional text into clear English. Plain language drafting
encompasses more than grammar and word choice. We changed
negatives to positives to give the text an active and enabling tone rather
than a regulatory tone. We carefully ordered provisions to make them
more coherent and to lead readers logically through processes that the
constitution sets up. And we paid attention to using words consistently,
accurately, and grammatically.
Some of the results were astounding. We changed negative
wording to positive so that the constitution would be cast as an
26. See Gehieme Gesprek Lei Tot Deurbraak [Secret Talks to Breakthrough], DIE BEELD,
Apr. 20, 1996 (referring to the three weeks of negotiation which preceded this
decision); Minutes of the 38th Meeting of the Constitutional Committee (Apr. 18-19,
1996).
27. The core membership of the Technical Refinement Team was Gerrit Grove,
Phil Knight, Christina Murray and Johan van der Westhuizen. The deputy chair of the
Constitutional Assembly's administration, Louisa Zondo, chaired it. Hassen Ebrahim,
the executive director of the Assembly, participated in many of its meetings, and a
number of other people participated at various times.
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enabling and empowering document rather than as one focused on
restrictions and limitations. In the following example, this also reduced
33 words to 20:
Original Text:
Only South African citizens qualified to vote in elections of the
National Assembly and who are not otherwise disqualified in terms
of this section are eligible to be members of the National Assembly.
Refined text:
Every citizen who is qualified to vote for the National Assembly is
eligible to be a member of Assembly except ......
Some changes allowed greater clarity as in section 172(1 )(b):
Original text:
[A] court may suspend a declaration of invalidity for a
specific period to allow the competent authority to correct the
defect and impose such conditions in that regard as it may
decide.
Refined text:
[A] court may make . . . an order suspending [a] declaration
of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to allow
the competent authority to correct the defect.
We also changed language to improve readability by removing words
that added padding, but no new meaning. See, for example, sections 49
and 50.29
28. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 4, § 47(I).
29. The refined text given here is not that in the final constitution. The approach
to the dissolution of Parliament and votes of no confidence changed later in the process
and the provisions, now sections 50 and 102, read as follows:
50. (I) The President must dissolve the National Assembly if-
(a) the Assembly has adopted a resolution to dissolve, supported by a
majority of its members; and
(b) three years have passed since the Assembly was elected.
(2) The Acting President must dissolve the National Assembly if-
(a) there is a vacancy in the office of President; and
(b) the Assembly fails to elect a new President within 30 days of the
vacancy occurring.
102. (1) If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by the majority of its
members, passes a motion of no-confidence in the Cabinet excluding
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Original text:
The National Assembly as constituted in terms of a general
election shall continue for a term of five years as from the
date of such election, unless dissolved before the expiry of its
term in terms of this Constitution.
The National Assembly may be dissolved before the end of
the term for which it was elected if a vote of no confidence in
the Cabinet is passed by the National Assembly.
Refined text:
The National Assembly is elected for a term of five years.
The National Assembly may be dissolved before the end of its
term if it passes a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet.
We rearranged text to present events in a chronological order. See, for
example, section 51(1):
Original text:
The National Assembly may determine the time and place of
its sittings and its recess periods. The first sitting for the
National Assembly after an election shall take place ....
Refined text:
After an election, the first sitting of the National Assembly
must take place at a time and on a date .... The Assembly
may determine the time and duration of its other sittings and
its recess periods.
Issues of gender equality were prominent through the entire
drafting process. This concern is particularly evident in the Bill of
Rights provisions, which protect gender equality and spell out that the
right to security of the person includes a right to be free from private
forms of violence and to make decisions concerning reproduction.
3 °
the President, the President must reconstitute the Cabinet.
(2) If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by the majority of its
members, passes a motion of no-confidence in the President, the President
and the other members of the Cabinet and any Deputy Ministers must resign.
S. AFR. CONST. ch. 4, §§ 50, 102.
30. Section 9 of the South African Constitution is the equality provision. It states:
(I) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and
benefit of the law.
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.
To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures
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But we also attempted to reflect this concern for the equality of women
and men in the language of the constitution with two decisions. First,
we changed language to make the text generally free of specific gender
references. Thus, section 43 of the Interim Constitution read: "A
member of the National Assembly shall vacate his or her seat if he or
she . . . ." while the equivalent provision in the final Constitution states
that, "[a] person loses membership of the National Assembly if that
person . ,3 Gender neutrality did lead to one decision that many
English speakers find difficult to accept. The constitution uses the
word "their" in the singular-the epicene pronoun. Thus, section 10
states that "[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have their
dignity respected and protected."
But gender neutrality did not only irritate the purists who were
uncomfortable with the singular use of the word "their." Removing all
references to both men and women also brought with it the danger of
excluding women in much the same way that the traditional legal
assumption that the masculine includes the feminine does. This danger
results from our stereotypical assumption that the actors in politics
designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons,
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy,
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age,
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth.
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone
on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must
be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination.
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is
unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair.
S. AFR. CONST. ch. 4, § 9. Section 12 deals with freedom and security of the person:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which
includes the right:
(a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause;
(b) not to be detained without trial;
(c) to be free from all forms of violence from both public and private
sources;
(d) not to be tortured in any way; and
(e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.
(2) Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which
includes the right:
(a) to make decisions concerning reproduction;
(b) to security in and control over their body; and
(c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without
their informed consent.
S. AFR. CONST. ch. 4, § 12.
31. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 4, § 47(3).
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must be men. To counteract this, the constitution expressly refers to
men and women whenever it deals with appointments to office, thereby
emphasising that either a woman or a man could hold the office.
Section 46 provides an example:
Original text:
The National Assembly consists of... members.
Refined text:
The National Assembly consists of . . . women and men
elected as members ...
But it is in section 207, "Control of police services," that the point is
really driven home. It states: "The President . . . must appoint a
woman or man as the National Commissioner of the police service, to
control and manage the police service." Most politicians viewed this
as a futuristic flight of fancy.
Should it be "men and women" or "women and men," we
wondered at one point, or should we alternate the phrases? Ramaphosa
resolved that issue briskly from the chair. It was to be "women and
men, throughout."
The plain-language drafting process was controversial,
particularly among lawyers. In berating the decision to use "plain
language" and alluding to the Canadian expert who assisted in the
process, a prominent academic lawyer suggested that the text had been
through a "Canadian Laundromat." And a member of the Technical
Refinement Team, who was a long-standing member of the South
African Department of Justice with substantial experience in drafting,
worried that changes to traditional language would have unanticipated
consequences. Thus meetings of the Team involved both complicated
discussion about what the often fuzzy text generated in the political
process actually meant and intense debate about what language is
appropriate in a constitution.
One particularly heated discussion concerned the archaic term
"office of profit." In accordance with the principle of separation of
powers, South African constitutions have always excluded from
membership of the legislature, people who hold an "office of profit" in
the executive. 2 The technical committee dealing with the membership




of Parliament had proposed using this traditional phrase. "But what
exactly is 'an office of profit'?" we asked late one night as we were
preparing the text for the committee. "It is absolutely essential that we
retain those words," the state law adviser told us, "they come from our
common law and have a well-established meaning, spelt out in many
cases. If they are changed legal uncertainty will result." The commit-
tee deferred, but when the provision was discussed in committee, the
politicians sprung on the words "office of profit." They asked, "Why
is this obscure phrase here?" We did not have an answer that satisfied
the committee. "It must be changed," we were directed.33 Later, as we
attempted to clarify the provision, we read the cases and found them
deeply confusing. The new provision excludes from membership of a
legislature "anyone who is appointed by, or is in the service of, the
state and receives remuneration for that service." It is perhaps
longwinded, but the concepts of employment and service are familiar
to modern readers and at least the new wording does not carry with it
the convoluted jurisprudence of the past.
The language of the constitution is still both praised and
derided. Some hold it up as a model; others claim that it has led to
legal uncertainty and ambiguity. However, thus far there is no
evidence that courts have had any greater difficulty with the language
of the constitution than other legal texts, and significantly, the
provisions that critics claim demonstrate the wrong-headedness of
plain-language drafting are usually provisions that were not drafted in
plain language at all, but were the result of last minute compromises,
with wording sometimes hastily cobbled together, reflecting the
ambiguity of those agreements.
IlI. DEADLOCK OR AGREEMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
The interim constitution established a convoluted process for
breaking deadlocks. First, the Panel of Constitutional Experts was to
review the new constitution. 4 The Panel had a month to come up with
"deadlock-breaking" ideas. But the Panel, of which I was a member,
consisted of two practicing lawyers and five academic lawyers. From
an early stage it was apparent to the panelists and, presumably, also to
the politicians, that a group of lawyers was unlikely to broker a
33. See Draft Minutes of the Thirty-Second Meeting of the Constitutional
Committee, at 5.4.1 (ii) (November 9-10, 1995). See also <http://www.constitution.
org.za/cgi-bin/vdkwcgi/xb4fl f88a-6>.
34. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. (Act 200, 1993), §§ 72, 73.
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settlement when the veteran negotiators involved in the process were
unable to do so." Thus, when the deadline drew near and the resolu-
tion of a number of critical issues seemed elusive, it was another
element of the deadlock-breaking process, a referendum, which
politicians anticipated.
The interim constitution said that if a draft constitution did not
command two-thirds of the vote but did gain the support of the majority
of the members, it could nevertheless become the country's constitu-
tion if it was supported by sixty percent of the voters in a referendum.36
But a referendum was not attractive to any of the parties.3' First, it
would publicly announce an inability to agree and, in doing so, cast
doubt on claims that South Africa had found a constructive and
inclusive way of resolving its political differences. This could only
have a serious impact on the country, both undermining investor
confidence and undermining the important, albeit complex, partnership
of the old and the new that was smoothing the transition. Second, a
referendum campaign would inevitably be adversarial, and, although
tensions had run high in the Constitutional Assembly at times, overall
the process was marked by restraint and a commitment to resolve
issues rather than score points and impress an electorate. The process
in the Assembly had often had a non-partisan flavor and the public
participation program, organized by the administration of the Assembly
rather than individual parties, accentuated that. Campaigning for a
referendum would inevitably be deeply partisan. The partisan nature
of such a campaign would also mark a failure to draft a constitution
that all South Africans "owned." Rather than being a unifying
document, it would divide. Third, recourse to a referendum would
mean personal failure for many of the politicians involved. Those who
had been involved in the negotiations from the beginning were deeply
committed to a successful transition-and to demonstrating their ability
to achieve it. Fourth, politicians had reason to fear the kind of issues
that would form the focus of a referendum. Some of the matters that
35. There was, however, a point in the process when a colleague of mine on the
panel said that he thought we had created a deadlock. One of the more tricky provisions
to draft was that relating to amnesty for past actions by both the apartheid government
and liberation movements. We suggested that an early version of the provision which
reflected a particularly thorny agreement was itself problematic, thus opening up the
entire debate again. In fact, the Constitutional Court rejected the provision finally
settled on and adopted in the May 1996 version of the constitution. Schedule 6, item
22 of the constitution now deals with the matter.
36. See S. AFR. INTERIM CONST. (Act 200, 1993), § 73(6).
37. See GLOPPEN, supra note 24, at 209.
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seemed to defy resolution in the Constitutional Assembly would
certainly have been part of the debate, but a number of others that the
Assembly had managed to settle might have come up as well. For
instance, the ANC was firmly committed to outlawing the death
penalty, while the National Party was equally firmly in favor of
retaining it. In spite of the huge majority of the vote held by the ANC,
evidence from polls suggested that the majority of the population
probably supported the National Party on this matter. It had been
resolved in the constitution-drafting process by leaving it to the
Constitutional Court; the right to life clause is silent on the matter of
the death penalty and simply says, "[e]veryone has a right to life."
Senior negotiators would not have desired to add this contested matter
to their list of differences. Finally, a referendum would be costly and
interfere with the urgent tasks that faced the new government.3 8
In short, neither of the major parties in the negotiations had much
reason to choose a referendum. And so, in spite of rumors and press
reports that the Assembly could not make the May 9 deadline, and
threats of deadlock by both the ANC and the National Party, the
Constitutional Assembly voted to pass the new constitution with only
two nays and ten abstentions.39 The Assembly broke into applause and
song and, that evening, exhausted negotiators joined their political
colleagues and Constitutional Assembly staff at a huge "Adoption
Day" party, hosted by President Mandela.
But those most closely involved in the process knew that this was
not the end. The constitution was still to be certified by the Constitu-
tional Court, and there were a number of issues that might block
certification. In fact, although they had voted in favor of the constitu-
tion, the National Party and the Democratic Party, among others, had
already given notice of their intention to challenge certain provisions
before the Constitutional Court.4
This tactic had been anticipated for some time, and it meant that
certification had come to play an additional role. Certification was no
38. As it was, almost country-wide local government elections which were held in
November 1995 had absorbed the attention of politicians and hampered the program of
the Constitutional Assembly.
39. The two members of the African Christian Democratic party voted against the
new constitution because it failed to subject all government and law to the law of God.
The Freedom Front abstained. In addition, the Inkatha Freedom Party remained outside
the process and did not vote.
40. The Democratic Party stated in its speech in Parliament on adoption day that
although it would vote for the constitution, it intended to contest certain elements before
the Constitutional Court.
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longer merely a way of ensuring that pre-election deals were kept; it
allowed parties to move some issues from the negotiating forum to the
Constitutional Court and to take their chances there.
The dispute concerning the most appropriate way to deal with
labour relations in the Bill of Rights provides an example. Labour
rights, and particularly the right of employees to strike and the right of
employers to exclude workers from the workplace ("lockout"), were an
issue over which the Constitutional Assembly came as close to a fatal
deadlock as it could.
Constitutional Principle XXVIII stated, "the right of employers
and employees to join and form employer organizations and trade
unions and to engage in collective bargaining shall be recognised and
protected." The political, social, and economic background to the
principle and the subsequent difficulties in negotiating provisions
agreeable to both sides are obvious. Organized black labour had been
in opposition to the apartheid government for over a decade,4' and the
ANC was in an alliance with the trade union alliance, the Congress of
South African Trade Unions ("COSATU"), depending heavily on the
support of labour. On the other hand, the National Party and other
opposition parties depended on the support of the largely white
business community. No one disputed that the constitution would
include a right to strike, but the right to lockout was controversial.
White business demanded a right to lockout as a necessary counterpart
to the right of workers to strike; but the predominantly black trade
union alliance disagreed. In addition, the opposition parties argued that
Principle XXVIII provided an express protection of the right of
individual employers to engage in collective bargaining and not merely
a right entitling associations of employers to engage in collective
bargaining. The ANC would not concede this point.
As the deadline for adoption of the final constitution drew near,
pressure on the Constitutional Assembly concerning these labour rights
grew. COSATU threatened to strike if their constitutional demands
were not incorporated in the constitution. Business responded by
complaining that COSATU was not using the established labour
negotiating chamber to discuss these matters and, citing the need to
reassure potential foreign investors, the vulnerable state of the currency
and the loss in production that a strike would mean, said, "mass action
could not come at a worse time." '4  By the end of April, deadlock had
41. Since black trade unions had been legalized in 1979.
42. COSA TU Strikes a Blow, WKLY. MAIL & GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 1996), available at
<http://web.sn.apc.org/wmail/issues/960426/BUS44.html>. See also Frank Nxumalo,
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been declared on the labour issues, as well as the property clause and
the language in which schooling should be offered.43
Negotiations continued, however, with politicians determined not
to scupper the entire process over a few clauses, and the apparent
impasse was bridged. In announcing agreement on the labour
provision that was reached on the eve of the deadline, the ANC
politician involved in the negotiations commented that "he did not
expect anybody to be very happy."'  Indeed, the provision was pure
compromise, avoiding saying anything explicit about lockouts and
instead immunizing the recently adopted and generally supported
Labour Relations Act from constitutional scrutiny.45  The winning
element was apparently the assurance that existing labour legislation
would not be amended without proper consultation with business.
Obvious problems resulted from this approach. The Constitutional
Principles anticipated a constitutional regime in which statutory
provisions were subject to the supremacy of the constitution. The
labour-rights compromise immunized a statute from constitutional
scrutiny. When this solution to the dispute over the labour provision
was announced, the National Party spokesperson made it clear that his
party was not satisfied. They would vote for the constitution with this
provision in it, he said, but would nevertheless contest it in court
because they did not believe that it complied with the Constitutional
Principle that dealt with labour rights. And so, the battle over the
constitution moved to the Constitutional Court.
COSATU to Go Higher Over Right to Strike, INDEP. ONLINE (May 12, 1996), at
<http://www.iol.co.za/html/frame_news.php>.
43. See EBRAHIM, supra note 15, at 205-11. See also Constitutional Assembly,
Minutes of the Forty-Second Meeting of the Constitutional Committee (May 1-2, 1996),
available at <http://www.constitution.org.za>; High Drama in Constitutional Danger Zone,
WKLY. MAIL & GUARDIAN (May I, 1996), available at <http://web.sn.apc.org/wmail/
issues /960501/NEWS58.html>.
44. Minutes of Constitutional Committee Meeting (May 7, 1996).
45. See EBRAHIM, supra note 15, at 216 (describing the meeting). The provision,
section 241 of the draft constitution, was headed "Labour Relations Act, 1995." It
stated:
(1) A provision of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act No. 66 of 1995)
remains valid, despite the provisions of the Constitution, until the provision
is amended or repealed.
(2) A Bill to amend or repeal a provision of the Labour Relations Act, 1995
may be introduced in Parliament only after consultation with national
federations of trade unions, and employer organisations.
(3) The consultation referred to in subsection (2), including the identification
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The court had little difficulty with the provision and held that it did
not comply with the Constitutional Principles because it undermined
the supremacy of the constitution. But the court offered something
positive to each side in holding that the principles did not require a
constitutionally protected right to lockout, supporting the position that
labour had taken, but adding that the principles did require an unambig-
uous protection of an employer's right to engage in collective bargain-
ing. In the second round of negotiations, this matter resolved quite
easily.
The Constitutional Principles thus not only provided a way of
resolving a fundamental disagreement about the process of
constitution-making; they also allowed certain problems to be shifted
out of the formal political process to another forum during the
constitution-making process-this time, the Constitutional Court.46
The certification process also provided an opportunity for the IFP to
rejoin the constitutional debates. Although it had not participated in the
process of formulating the constitution, it took part in the certification
process, challenging a wide range of provisions, particularly those that
dealt with the division of power between the national and provincial
governments.
The Constitutional Court judgment announcing that it could not
certify the newly adopted constitution was lengthy, comprising 150
printed pages in the South African Law Reports.47 It also set out in
fairly unambiguous terms the changes that were necessary if the
constitution was to meet the test of the principles."
As soon as the Constitutional Court decision was handed down the
Constitutional Assembly reassembled. Some politicians found some
46. Of course, it is too simplistic to assume that the ability of parties to shift
matters to the court was the only reason for various compromises in the constitution.
From the governing ANC's point of view at least, the fact that constitutional
amendment provisions and the ANC's large share of the vote make amendment
relatively easy at present may have meant that compromises were not necessarily
forever. The National Party, on the other hand, had clearly won in the 1993 round-the
Constitutional Principles encapsulated many of its most important positions.
47. See In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,
1996 (4) SALR 744 (CC).
48. A side effect of the Constitutional Court's role in the certification process was
that the court gained credibility in the white legal community. When the court was first
established, the overall attitude of the white press and white lawyers seemed to be that
it was biased towards the ANC. People believed that it would simply rubber-stamp
ANC decisions. The willingness of the court to take the Constitutional Principles
seriously pointed in the opposite direction. While the court (like all constitutional
courts) has not been free from allegations of being executive-minded, the certification
judgment reassured many people.
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aspects of the decision annoying, but they accepted it, and a rather
weary group resumed work in September 1996. 49  The timetable was
once again tough. If the new constitution was to be put into operation
in early 1997, as many hoped it would be, the Assembly needed to
submit it to the Constitutional Court for certification in early October.
This timeframe gave the Assembly just three weeks for the revision.
A series of long and intense meetings took place and the Assembly
finished amending the constitution just in time.
Although the constitution was revisited because the court had held
that it did not comply with the Constitutional Principles in certain
ways, the resumption of the work of the Assembly created two
important opportunities unrelated to the principles. First, advisers to
the Assembly were able to introduce a list of technical amendments to
the text aimed at tidying up provisions that had been hastily drafted,
and to deal with inconsistencies and other errors that had been picked
up since the draft was first passed.
Second, the resumption of the Constitutional Assembly process
gave the IFP another chance to participate. A substantial number. of
IFP politicians had regretted the party's decision not to participate over
the past fifteen months. On one occasion, an IFP MP wandered absent-
mindedly into an Assembly meeting. With his characteristically wry
humour, Ramaphosa welcomed her warmly from the chair, and she fled
to the chuckles of the group. But on another occasion she had confided
that she longed to participate. Many people speculated on the impact
that IFP participation might have had on the process and concluded that
it would surely have been marked. So it was not a surprise that, after
its success in the Constitutional Court in challenging certain of the
regional arrangements in the draft constitution, the IFP indicated an
interest in taking part in the second process. Members of the party
49. The aspect of the court's decision that caused the most resentment was that on
local government. The Constitutional Principles described the way in which the new
constitution should deal with local government in some detail. There was little doubt
that the first draft of the constitution had relied on a liberal interpretatidn of this
requirement and so the court's decision that the constitution did not comply with the
principles was not totally unexpected. But the Assembly was not really ready to
provide the detail in the constitution that the court said it needed. Policy concerning the
future of local government was unsettled, and the government was in the middle of a
long and thorough process of consultation. The difficulties that had been encountered
drafting the local government provisions in the first round were not so much related to
political disagreement between parties as to a lack of decision on what was desirable.
The first draft had accordingly tried to leave leeway for future developments. The
second draft had to be more concrete and, because the Assembly did not want to risk
another non-certification, it needed to provide a great deal of detail.
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attended various meetings, but they soon withdrew, partly because their
requests to reopen issues that had not been impugned by the Court were
routinely rejected. The National Party and ANC were determined not
to encumber the process with discussions that might undermine delicate
compromises reached in the preceding months of negotiations. It may
have also been part of the lingering dispute about international
mediation that provoked their withdrawal at the outset. It was almost
surely also caused by the fact that they were outsiders in the process.
The intensity of debate and decision-making over the fifteen months
that the Constitutional Assembly was active had established patterns of
behavior, modes of responding to problems, and relationships among
participants with which the IFP was unfamiliar, and this isolated it and
undermined its ability to influence decisions.
On December 4, 1996, the Constitutional Court certified that the
amended draft of the constitution complied with the principles." The
President signed it on International Human Rights Day, December 10,
and it came into effect on February 4, 1997.
IV. CONCLUSION: A NEW BEGINNING
In March 1997, about seven million copies of the new constitution
in pocket book size were distributed in South Africa. Four million
went to high schools, two million were made available at post offices
and another million were distributed to the police, army, prisons, and
through civil organizations. These copies of the constitution were
available in all eleven official languages and were accompanied by an
illustrated guide, You and the Constitution, which, in thirty cheerfully
illustrated pages, provided an introduction to the constitution.5 '
The constitution, You and the Constitution tells South Africans,
"helps to make sure that there will always be democracy in South
Africa." The Preamble to the constitution itself conveys the same idea
but contextualizes it, and links it to the aspirations of South Africans.
The Preamble looks back to past suffering, and to the struggle for
justice and freedom, and looks forward to "a united and democratic
South Africa" in which "government is based on the will of the
people," in which "every citizen is equally protected by law" and in
which "the quality of life of all citizens" is improved.
50. See Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, 1996, 1997 (2) SALR 97 (CC).
51. See EBRAHIM, supra note 15, at 249-50. You and the Constitution was written by
Greg Moran and produced by the Constitutional Assembly in 1996.
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But, a constitution on paper is hardly a constitution at all, however
progressive its contents and however careful its design. It must draw
its life from the society that it orders and from the people who have
committed themselves to the values that it enshrines. This process
started in the open and transparent way in which the constitution was
drafted and in the massive education programmes that accompanied the
drafting process and followed the adoption of the constitution. But a
great deal more is needed. The constitution has to demonstrate that it
provides a blueprint for effective government, able to make and
implement the policies needed to effect transformation in South Africa.
Strong leaders, committed to the principles of constitutionalism, are
essential. Commenting on politics in South Africa since the 1994
elections, Tom Lodge has written that "[i]n new democracies the
quality of political leadership matters more than in established political
systems, however carefully scripted the constitutional safeguards may
be against abuse of power. Institutions are still fluid and susceptible to
being shaped by dominant personalities."52  Until constitutional
government is deeply entrenched in the practice of governing in South
Africa, the constitution will be especially vulnerable to choices that
undermine rather than entrench the values that it enshrines. This means
that the task of South Africans has only just begun.
52. ToM LODGE, SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS SINCE 1994, 110 (1999).
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